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INTRODUCTION
Secured creditors and their proxies in academia have proposed
to expand the scope of the Article 9 personal property security inter-
t The author is an Acting Professor at UCLA School of Law and also serves Of Coun-
sel to Stutman, Treister & Glatt Professional Corporation in Los Angeles. The author
thanks Martin Barash, Esq., for editing and research assistance in preparing this Article.
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est to a practically unlimited scope.1 With the check of a box, virtually
all personal property can be encumbered. 2 The purported objective
of the reform is to expand the extension of credit and increase its
efficiency by lowering the transaction costs associated with secured
credit.3
Critics have questioned whether expansion of the scope of Article
9 is necessary or wise.4 Indeed, some commentators have questioned
1 See UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE REVISED ARTicLE 9 (Members Consultative Group
Draft No. 2, Apr. 14, 1997) [hereinafter DRAFTr REVISION] (on file with author). The Amer-
ican Law Institute's UCC Article 9 Drafting Committee prepared the Draft Revision. Id.
Although the proposal expands the scope of the Article 9 personal property security inter-
est, the Drafting Committee has strategically tempered that expansion to accommodate
political interests that otherwise would oppose the proposal. Accordingly, the expanded
Article 9 excludes personal injury tort recoveries and consumer deposit accounts from its
scope. See infra note 2.
2 The Draft Revision proposes to expand the reach of the Article 9 security interest
to include all deposit accounts (excluding certain consumer accounts), tort claims (with
the exceptions of after-acquired and personal injury tort claims), and medical insurance
receivables. DRAFr REvIsION, supra note 1, §§ 9-113, 9-304. Under the Draft Revision, the
check of a box will be sufficient to perfect a blanket security interest in all property of a
debtor to which an Article 9 security interest may attach, with the narrow exception of
deposit accounts and certain securities-related assets. Id. at 22-23 (proposed § 9-111), 134-
38 (proposed § 9-521 with financing statement form). With respect to those exceptions,
however, a cursory description such as "all deposit accounts" or the like may extend the
security interest. Id at 22-23.
Inclusion of all deposit accounts, other than consumer deposit accounts, is inten-
tional. The inclusion of blocked accounts, from which the debtor has no right of with-
drawal without the lender's consent, is uncontroversial. On the other hand, the inclusion
of operating deposit accounts, from which the debtor is free to make withdrawals at will, in
the absence of default under the security documents, is quite controversial. See, e.g., Letter
from Donald J. Rapson, Assistant General Counsel, CIT Group, to Professors Steven L.
Harris and Charles W. Mooney, respectively of the Chicago-Kent College of Law and the
University of Pennsylvania Law School (May 21, 1996) (on file with author).
3 See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security
Interests: Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REv. 2021, 2021 (1994) ("[W]e take as
our 'first principle' that Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 should facilitate the creation
of security interests. Stated otherwise, we think the transfer of an effective security interest
ought to be as easy, inexpensive, and reliable as possible."). Professors Harris and Mooney
are the Reporters for the Permanent Editorial Board Article 9 Study Committee.
4 See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Chapter 11: AnAgendaforBasic Reform, 69 Am. BANrR. LJ.
573, 579 (1995); Memorandum from David Lander to Edwin E. Smith, Chair, and Mem-
bers of the Article 9 Task Force (Oct. 27, 1995) (on file with author); Letter from Gerald
K. Smith, Lewis and Roca LLP, to Edwin E. Smith, Chair, Article 9 Task Force (Oct. 24,
1995) (on file with author); Memorandum from Elizabeth Warren, Leo Gottlieb Professor
of Law, Harvard Law School, to Edwin E. Smith, Chair, Article 9 Task Force, and Members
of the Article 9 Task Force (Oct. 31, 1995) (on file with author); Audio tape of program on
"The Unsecured Creditor and Article 9: Bambi Meets Godzilla Again and Is Better off Ex
Ante," presented at the 1996 Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools
(Jan. 5, 1996) (on file with the Association of American Law Schools). As Professor War-
ren has noted, Professor Grant Gilmore, the principal draftsman of the original Article 9,
presaged this debate and contributed his criticism over 15 years ago. In his last law review
article, Professor Gilmore lamented the trend toward encumbering all of a debtor's prop-
erty: "[D]oes it make any sense to award everything to a secured party who stands idly by
while a doomed enterprise goes down the slippery slope into bankruptcy?" Grant Gilmore,
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the efficiency of secured credit as an initial proposition. 5 The secured
creditors' grab to expand the scope of Article 9 has sparked a reaction
in academia and the practicing bar. Specifically, Professor Elizabeth
Warren has suggested that Article 9 be amended to dedicate a portion
of the secured party's collateral to repayment of judicial lien credi-
tors.6 Her Proposal is based on the suggestion by Professors Lucian
Bebchuk and Jesse Fried that granting full priority to secured credit is
inefficient because it captures values that belong to involuntary and
less sophisticated creditors. 7
Not surprisingly, the secured credit bar and commercial law
professors have responded with a vengeance. They have attacked the
Proposal for, inter alia, violating freedom of contract,8 subverting the
financing of small business,9 and providing unsecured creditors with a
basis to extort value from secured creditors.10 This Article exposes the
attacks for what they are: hysterical efforts to entrench wealth in the
hands of banks, insurance companies, and finance companies at the
expense of tort creditors, tax creditors, environmental creditors, and,
perhaps, employees and trade creditors.
A. Burden of Proof Regarding Article 9 Expansion and the
Proposal
We start by examining the burden of proof. Article 9 supporters
believe proponents of the Warren Proposal bear the burden of proof
on the Proposal as well as Article 9 reform. While Warren should bear
the burden of proof on her Proposal, the Article 9 reformers should
bear the burden of proof on the scope of Article 9 reform. If propo-
nents of Article 9 ref6rm believe expansion of its scope is justified,
they should prove that efficiency gains will result."
The Good Faith Purchase Idea and-the Uniform Commercial Code: Confessions of a Repentant Drafts-
man, 15 GA. L. REv. 605, 627 (1981).
5 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchik & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 872-79 (1996); David Gray Carlson, On the
Efficiency of Secured Lending, 80 VA. L. Rnv. 2179 (1994).
6 Memorandum from Elizabeth Warren, Leo Gottlieb Professor of Law, Harvard Law
School, to the Council of the American Law Institute 1-2 (Apr. 25, 1996) [hereinafter
Proposal] (on file with author) (regarding the Article 9 set aside for unsecured creditors).
7 Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 5, at 880-95.
8 See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Turner, Should the Scope of an Article 9 Security Interest Be at
All Limited? If So, How? I (Oct. 31, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
9 See, e.g., Letter from H. Bruce Bernstein, General Counsel, Commercial Finance
Association, to Edwin Smith, Chairman, Article 9 Task Force 2-3 (June 6, 1996) (on file
with author).
10 See, e.g., Letter from Joel B. Zweibel, Partner, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, to Lucian A.
Bebchuk &Jesse Fried, Professors, Harvard Law School 8-9 (Oct. 18, 1996) (on fie with
author).
11 See, e.g., Letter from Howard Ruda, Counsel, Hahn & Hessen LLP, to Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School 3-4 (May 22, 1996) (on file
with author); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy,
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B. Efficiency
It is doubtful that expanding the scope of Article 9 will result in
net efficiency gains. While the case can be made that expansion of
the scope of Article 9 will create efficiency gains in some projects, the
opposite will be true with respect to other projects. As a matter of
course, secured lenders have the upper hand in negotiating secured
transactions. Except in the largest transactions, there is no negotia-
tion with the debtor over the boilerplate langauge in the financing
documents. If proponents successfully expand the scope of Article 9,
secured lenders can be expected to take all personal property collat-
eral as a matter of course. Yet the borrowing base will not increase
with respect to many categories of collateral, including operating de-
posit accounts. As a result, the dollar amount of the debtor's consen-
sual unsecured credit should contract or become more expensive
because it is more risky. Moreover, the debtor's nonconsensual un-
secured creditors will bear additional risks without compensation for
those risks. In addition, the debtor's ability to reorganize will be re-
duced, because it will have no free and clear assets with which to oper-
ate or fund a plan of reorganization once its secured loan is in default.
Professor Elizabeth Warren has proposed counteracting the sug-
gested expansion of the scope of Article 9 by permitting judicial lien
creditors to surcharge up to 20% of the value of the collatdral.12 Pro:
fessorJay Westbrook has suggested a similar approach, but only in the
event that the debtor is insolvent or bankrupt.13 Secured creditors,
their attorneys, and their sympathizers in academia have responded
with predictable outrage. Stripping away the rhetoric and hyperbole
from their attacks, we face fundamental theoretical questions about
both the suggested reform of Article 9 and the Proposal. Is the exten-
sion of secured; credit beneficial, and if so, are there imits on the
truth of this proposition?
Article 9 proponents love secured credit.14 Secured credit is said
to lower the debtor's borrowing costs and to provide liquidity to en-
able the debtor to avoid bankruptcy. 15 The debtor's unsecured credi-
tors are thought to be free-riding beneficiaries of this process. 16 On
47 DuKE LJ. (forthcoming Dec. 1997) (manuscript at 4, on file with author) ("The burden
of regulation [to limit the priority or scope of an Article 9 security interest] therefore
should be on its advocates to show, by persuasive empirical evidence, that unsecured credi-
tors need protection, a burden that has not been met.").
12 Proposal, supra note 6, at 1.
13 Memorandum from Jay L. Westbrook, Benno C. Schmidt Chair of Business Law,
University of Texas School of Law, to Geoffrey Hazard, Director of The American Law
Institute 546 (Sept. 4, 1996) (on file with author).
14 See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 11.
15 See id. (manuscript at 4-6).
16 Se id.
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the other hand, skeptics counter these contentions with some force.
If secured credit is such a panacea, why do some creditors extend un-
secured credit voluntarily? Surely the market must recognize that
there are transaction costs that make security interests inefficient for
large categories of lenders. If secured credit actually reduces a
debtor's borrowing costs, why do debtors seek unsecured credit? Per-
haps debtors recognize that secured credit typically is much more re-
strictive on the debtor's business operations than is unsecured credit.
Considering the problem as an issue of corporate finance pro-
vides useful insights. The debtor's weighted average after tax17 cost of
capital (WACC) is computed by multiplying the volume of capital
times its percentage cost for each component of the capital structure,
and dividing by total capital.' 8 Thus, if a debtor's capital structure
comprises $500,000 of secured debt costing 10% annually, $300,000 of
unsecured debt costing 16% annually, and $200,000 of equity capital
from which investors demand a 20% annual rate of return, the WACC
is 13.8% ((($500,000 x 10%) + ($300,000 x 16%) + ($200,000 x 20%))
; $1,000,000). Secured credit enthusiasts contend that if such a
debtor can obtain additional secured credit at less than 13.8%, the
debtor will reduce its WACC. However, the WACC will be reduced
only if the costs of unsecured credit and equity capital do not adjust,
either because (i) these costs are fixed and cannot adjust or (ii) there
is no relative increase in risk that warrants adjustment. If unsecured
credit and equity capital costs do not adjust because there is no rela-
tive increased risk, then the marginal extension of secured credit is
beneficial (or at least not harmful). Nevertheless, if risk for the un-
secured creditors increases, then the extension of secured credit is not
beneficial, because either it will be offset by adjustment, or increased
risk will be borne by nonadjusting creditors.
Of course, it is possible that the benefits to the debtor, its employ-
ees, and society at large that will derive from the extension of secured
credit outweigh the detriments to unsecured creditors. That is, the
marginal extension of secured credit may be Kaldor-Hicks efficient,
even if it is not Pareto superior. 19 But that is precisely the focus of the
17 The after-tax cost of capital should be used in order to credit any tax benefit that
the debtor receives from a specific kind of financing. For example, if (1) the pre-tax cost
of the debtor's unsecured debt financing is 20%, (2) the debtor is in a marginal combined
income tax bracket of 40%, and (3) the debtor can utilize a deduction for interest paid or
accrued on the unsecured indebtedness to offset taxable income, then the after-tax cost of
unsecured debt capital is actually 12% (.20 - (.4 x .20)).
18 See generally MaRK S. SCARBERRY ET AL., BusiNzss REORGANiZATION IN BANKRuTrcy
781-85 (1996) (explaining calculation of the cost of capital).
19 For the extension of secured credit to be Pareto superior, the extension of secured
credit must make the secured creditor better off without making unsecured creditors
worse off. See Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HosrTRA L.
REv. 509, 512-13 (1980). For the extension of secured credit to be Kaldor-Hicks efficient,
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Proposal, which endeavors to compensate unsecured creditors for ex-
posure to increased risks.
Economists disagree whether there is one optimal capital struc-
ture, multiple optimal structures, or infinite optimal structures.2 0 Un-
til we know the answer to this issue, we cannot be certain whether
incremental secured credit will always be balanced by adjustments to
debt and equity capital, or whether it will move a debtor toward (or
away from) an optimal structure. We can be certain, however, that
granting a secured creditor excess collateral cannot benefit the debtor
unless it is accompanied by lower borrowing costs or a larger exten-
sion of credit (except perhaps to the extent that the excess collateral
may "shield" the debtor's property from levy by a third-party creditor).
By comparison to current law, the suggestion to expand Article 9 to
allow secured creditors to encumber virtually all personal property by
checking a box is certain to be detrimental in numerous circum-
stances. For example, it is doubtful that secured creditors will in-
crease credit availability or reduce borrowing costs based on the
encumbrance of the debtor's litigation recoveries and operating bank
accounts. These kinds of collateral offer a secured creditor a poten-
tial reduction of its deficiency in the event of default, but are too vari-
able to alter a lender's credit decision. Thus, in the event of default,
the secured creditor receives a random benefit, while the debtor and
unsecured creditors are deprived of the very assets that may finance
rehabilitation of the business. 21
RIPOSTE TO MACROCRITICISMS OF THE PROPOSAL
To counteract the secured creditor's pervasive lien, the Proposal
preserves some values for both the debtor's unsecured creditors and,
the benefits to the secured creditor and the debtor need only outweigh the harm to un-
secured creditors. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 13-14 (4th
ed. 1992) (explaining and providing an example of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency).
20 For example, traditional economists would contend that application of the Modi-
gliani-Miller hypothesis to an extension of secured credit would result in the cost savings
from secured credit being matched by an identical increase in the cost of unsecured credit.
See Alan Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1051, 1054 (1984).
Law-and-economics scholars might contend that secured credit would provide a net gain
because involuntary or nonadjusting unsecured creditors cannot compensate for the in-
creased risk to them imposed by an extension of secured credit. See, e.g., Paul M. Shupack,
Solving the Puzzle of Secured Transactions, 41 RutGERS L. REv. 1067, 1106-07 (1989). Contem-
porary law-and-economics scholars might contend that the extension of new money se-
cured credit increases the debtor's liquidity, thereby reducing the risk of its bankruptcy
and increasing the value for all concerned, including the unsecured creditors. See
Schwarcz, supra note 11 (manuscript at 5-6).
21 This type of random benefit has led some Article 9 aficionados to argue that an
unperfected lienholder should defeat ajudicial lien creditor by reversing priorities under
UCC § 9-301 (1). SeeJames J. White, Revising Article 9 to Reduce Wasteful Litigation, 26 Loy.
LA L. REv. 823, 823-24 (1993).
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derivatively, the debtor's bankruptcy trustee. Specifically, the Propo-
sal permits a levying creditor to realize on execution up to 20% of the
value of a secured creditor's collateral. 22 Functionally, the secured
creditor's lien is shared pari passu with the levying creditor (or bank-
ruptcy trustee) up to 20% of the value of the collateral. 23 This process
repeats for each levying unsecured creditor.24
Others writing articles in this Symposium will justify the need for
the Proposal, explain the intricacies of the Proposal, debate whether it
should apply only on the debtor's insolvency or in bankruptcy, and
respond to technical critiques of the Proposal. By contrast, this Arti-
cle serves as a riposte to some of the loudest broad-based criticisms of
the Proposal.
A. Criticism Number 1: The Proposal Will Contract Credit
Thereby Inhibiting Growth and Causing Business
Failures
To some extent, the Proposal will deleverage American business.
In some cases, secured creditors will extend less secured credit to the
debtor because the Proposal's 20% surcharge will be factored into the
borrowing base. Under current law, lenders reduce the amount of
credit extended to take account of creditors who receive priority over
secured creditors under nonbankruptcy laws.25 Although, in many
cases, the decrease in secured borrowing will be offset by increased
extension of unsecured credit, in some cases there will be a net de-
crease in credit available to the debtor. For example, where the
debtor is in a risky start-up venture or on the verge of insolvency, the
risk to unsecured creditors might be so great that instead of seeking a
high interest rate to compensate for increased risk, they simply will
not extend new credit. The resulting liquidity crisis will force the
debtor into bankruptcy, where unsecured creditors will recover less
than if the debtor had not filed. Therefore, critics oppose the Propo-
sal because it hurts marginal businesses and will cause more
bankruptcies.
The critique is correct. At the margin, the Proposal will cause a
deleveraging of American business and more bankruptcies, but these
22 Proposal, supra note 6, at 1 (suggesting the adoption of a new U.C.C. § 9-301(5)).
23 The trustee in bankruptcy would obtain the status of a hypothetical levying creditor
for the entire amount of unsecured claims against the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1)
(1994); infra note 30.
24 Proposal, supra note 6, at 2 (discussion of sequential liens).
25 For example, lenders restrict the availability of credit to distributors of produce
whose inventory is subject to statutory liens of producers under the Perishable Agricultural
Commodities Act of 1930, 7 U.S.C. § 499e(c) (1994) (amended 1995). See Letter from H.
Bruce Bernstein to Edwin Smith, supra note 9, at 2.
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results are not necessarily undesirable.2 6  Under current law,
overleveraged businesses attract unsecured credit without justly com-
pensating unsecured creditors for risk. Tort creditors cannot adjust to
compensate for the increased risk. Other creditors that theoretically
are capable of adjusting for increased risk often cannot afford the
transaction costs to monitor the debtor to determine such risk. Em-
ployees, consumer customers, and small vendors fall into this cate-
gory. Even if these creditors become aware of the risk, some lack the
bargaining power to adjust for it. For example, a vendor whose only
customer is the debtor is unlikely to adjust by changing credit terms
or suspending shipping.27 Likewise, the debtor's employees are un-
likely to quit their jobs even if they fail to negotiate increased
benefits.28
Critics assume that because these nonadjusting unsecured credi-
tors will receive little in bankruptcy, they will prefer that the debtor
obtain more secured credit to avoid bankruptcy. 29 This critique is
static, and ignores the possibility that a greater extension of secured
credit will not forestall a later bankruptcy. In the interim, creditors
who extend unsecured credit to the debtor might well be worse off
than if they had extended this credit in a bankruptcy case-in which
they would enjoy at least an administrative expense priority claim for
the credit.
These critics also ignore the secured creditor's incentive to avoid
bankruptcy. Often, a secured creditor will manage a debtor's liquidity
crisis to maximize the value of collateral by collecting accounts receiv-
able and selling inventory in the ordinary course of business. Concur-
rently, the secured creditor will reduce its credit risk by reducing
advance rates, deferring capital expenditures, imposing cost controls,
and demanding equity infusions or reductions in insider benefits.
Although these actions may serve to maximize the value recovered by
the secured creditor, they may not reduce the risk of bankruptcy.
The Proposal will increase the secured creditor's incentive to
help the debtor avoid bankruptcy, particularly because the secured
26 See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 5, at 917-21 (arguing that a "partial-priority rule is
more likely to prevent the financing of an inefficient activity than an efficient one").
27 In the author's experience during Chrysler corporation's 1979-80 restructuring,
certain Chrysler parts manufacturers continued to ship parts even in the face of increased
risk.
28 In an analogous context, Professor Ronald Mann has observed and analyzed the
relative inability of contractors that extend labor and materials to real estate developers on
credit to adjust for increased risk (as compared to construction lenders). .RonaldJ. Mann,
The First Shall Be Last: A Contextual Argument for Abandoning Temporal Rules of Lien Priority, 75
TEx. L. REv. 11, 23-42 (1996). Based on these observations, Professor Mann has proposed
a uniform rule that would consistently subordinate the claims of construction lenders to
those of contractors. Id. at 13-14.
29 See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 11 (manuscript at 5-6).
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creditor is certain to lose 20% of the value of its collateral in a bank-
ruptcy case. 30 Moreover, the threat of a levy by an unpaid, unsecured
creditor will cause even the oversecured creditor to monitor the
debtor more closely than under current law. Because the Proposal
will render part of the secured creditor's claim unsecured, the se-
cured creditor will have the proper incentive to act efficiently, rather
than sacrifice asset values to maximize its secured position, as under
current law.
B. Criticism Number 2: If the Proposal Taxes Article 9 Security
Interests, Creditors Will Use Other Forms of Financing
to Avoid the Tax
Critics claim that even if a collateral surcharge is warranted, cred-
itors will avoid the tax by engaging in other forms of financing. 31 To
some extent, the critics are correct. Under current law, disparities in
treatment cause financiers to engage in alternatives to secured trans-
actions such as, inter alia, swaps, repurchase agreements, financing
trusts, sale-leaseback transactions, sales, securitization transactions,
and lease agreements. 3 2 Article 9 could be reformed, however, to
treat each of these transactions as a secured transaction when
recharacterization is appropriate. 33 Alternatively, state legislators
could regulate these forms of financing in a manner similar to an Arti-
cle 9 security interest. For example, under current law, most sales of
accounts are subject to Article 9.34 Similar changes could be made to
30 The secured creditor will lose 20% of its collateral to the trustee in bankruptcy
based on the trustee's status as a hypothetical judicial lien creditor. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 544(a) (1) (1994) (giving the trustee the status of a hypothetical judicial lien creditor). If
the allowed unsecured claims in the bankruptcy case total less than 20% of the value of the
collateral, the trustee may be limited to asserting lien status to the extent of allowed un-
secured claims. Compare, e.g., Whiteford Plastics Co. v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 179 F.2d 582 (2d
Cir. 1950) (trustee could not avoid lien where unsecured creditors had received all distri-
butions provided under confirmed plan of arrangement and therefore creditors would not
"benefit" from avoidance), with Acequia, Inc. v. Clinton (In re Acequia, Inc.), 34 F.3d 800,
811-12 (9th Cir. 1994) (trustee may avoid transfer notwithstanding the payment of un-
secured creditors' claims in full under confirmed plan of reorganization, as long as avoid-
ance may benefit the estate of a whole).
31 See, e.g., Lisa M. Bossetti & Mette H. Kurth, ProfessorElizabeth Warren's U C.C. Article 9
Carve-Out Proposak A Strategic Analysis, 30 UCC L.J. 3, 7-17 (1997); Schwarcz, supra note 11
(manuscript at 62-63); Memorandum from Jeffrey S. Turner, Partner, Brobeck Phleger &
Harrison LLP to Members of the Article 9 Task Force 7 (June 3, 1996) (on file with au-
thor); Letter from James J. White, Professor, University of Michigan Law School, to Edwin
E. Smith, Chair, Article 9 Task Force 5 (June 3, 1996) (on file with author). But see
Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 5, at 926-29 (discussing inefficiencies of leasehold as an alter-
native form of financing).
32 For example, the Bankruptcy Code grants special rights to a nondebtor party to a
swap or repurchase transaction. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 559-560 (1994).
33 Cf Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 5, at 928-29 (suggesting less favorable treatment of
lessors in bankruptcy as a means of discouraging circumvention of partial priority rule).
34 See U.C.C. § 9-102 (1) (b) (1994).
1474 [Vol. 82:1466
DEFENSE OF THE CARVE-OUT PROPOSAL
state mortgage laws to solve the problem with respect to real property
financing. Indeed, under current law, some states give priority to
nonadjusting environmental creditors ahead of the liens of mortga-
gees.3 5 Finally, Congress could amend the Bankruptcy Code to let
bankruptcy judges use equity powers36 to pierce through the form of
alternative financings where they are really secured financings in sub-
stance.37 But in order to encourage out-of-court restructurings with
lower transaction costs than bankruptcy, responsible state legislators
should invest such powers in state judges under state law.
Secured creditors and their apologists will howl with anguish at
the suggestion that courts be permitted to deal with substance over
form. They will insist that granting discretion to the judiciary to do
justice will create uncertainty in financing transactions and increase
borrowing costs. Critics have used similar scare tactics to attack equi-
table subordination, lender liability, and other equitable powers that
courts use to counter a rapacious secured creditor's overreaching. 38
Secured creditors live with some uncertainty today, and they will live
with it tomorrow. However, the proposal will also create certainty. In
keeping with the finest tradition of the common law,39 as long as the
secured creditor has assets in the United States or is subject to the
personal jurisdiction of United States courts, the judge will be able to
look to the substance of the transaction to do justice.
35 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-452a (1995); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:2281 (West
Supp. 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1371 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996); MASS. GEN. L.
ch. 21E, § 13 (1996); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:10-b (1996 & Supp. 1996); NJ. REv.
STAT. § 58:10-23.llf(f) (1992).
36 The Bankruptcy Code grants the bankruptcyjudge power to "issue any order, pro-
cess, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate" to carry out the Bankruptcy Code. 11
U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994). Congress intended that this grant of power be equivalent to the
All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1994). See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 175 (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6135 (stating that "[t]he bankruptcy court has ample additional
power to prevent damage to the bankrupt estate by such actions on a case-by-case basis")
(citing what is now codified as 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1994) and 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1994)). How-
ever, appellate courts have circumscribed this broad grant of power. See, e.g.,United States
v. Pepperman, 976 F.2d 123, 131 (3d Cir. 1992); Bird v. Carl's Grocery Co. (In re NWFX
Inc.), 864 F.2d 593, 595 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th
Cir. 1986).
37 Courts often recharacterize transactions as secured loans. See, e.g., Pacific Express,
Inc. v. Teknekron Infoswitch Corp. (In re Pacific Express, Inc.), 780 F.2d 1482, 1484-85
(9th Cir. 1986); Adelman v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (In re Tulsa Port Warehouse
Co.), 690 F.2d 809, 811-12 (10th Cir. 1982).
38 See, e.g., Laura Lin, The Information Content of a Bank's Involvement in Private Workouts,
3 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 97, 118-22 (1994); Scott M. Browning, Note, No Fault Equitable
Subordination: Reassuring Investors That Only Government Penalty Claims Are at Risk, 34 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 487 (1993); Mark Snyderman, Comment, What's So Good About Good Faith?
The Good Faith Performance Obligation in Commercial Lending, 55 U. Cm. L. REV. 1335, 1337-38
(1988).
39 See Bank of Matin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S.
295, 303-04 (1939).
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C. Criticism Number 3: The Proposal Infringes on Freedom of
Contract and Constitutes an Unconstitutional Taking of
Private Property for Public Use Without Just
Compensation
Critics attack the Proposal as an unwarranted regulation of the
free market, alienability of property, and freedom of contract.40 Some
even suggest that the Proposal raises Fifth Amendment takings
issues.41
The freedom of contract argument is a makeweight. Market pro-
ponents claim that the debtor should be able to determine without
governmental restraint whether to incur credit. This argument as-
sumes that the only interests affected by the contract are those of the
debtor and secured creditor, and that unsecured creditors can decide
not to extend credit to a debtor whose assets are fully encumbered.
However, the secured credit contract also affects the interests of
nonadjusting creditors that are not at the bargaining table when the
contract is negotiated.42 As a result, the debtor bargains away its inter-
ests for the benefit of the secured creditor. The Proposal remedies
this defect by exposing the secured creditor to the risk of holding an
unsecured deficiency claim, 43 thereby giving the secured creditor an
incentive to act in the interests of all creditors (except for perhaps
subordinated debtholders). 44 Regulation is warranted precisely be-
cause the tort and other nonadjusting creditors lack the legal capacity
or practical ability to protect themselves. On reflection, law and pub-
lic policy should require regulation of these contracts.
The takings argument is likewise a makeweight. To the extent
the Proposal is prospective, there is no takings issue. 45 All future liens
will be extended under a state law that provides a carve out for levying
creditors. To the extent the Proposal is retroactive, however, a taking
might not exist because the lien might be regarded as a contract right
40 See, e.g., Turner, supra note 31, at 2-3, 8.
41 See Memorandum from Jeffrey S. Turner to Members of the Article 9 Task Force,
supra note 8, at 3 n.2.
42 See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 5, at 932-34 (discussing freedom of contract cri-
tique and stating that "when the contract directly impinges on the rights of third parties,
there is no prima facie presumption of freedom of contract").
43 The Proposal ameliorates the risk that a fully secured creditor will become under-
secured by permitting secured creditors to require lien creditors to marshal against unen-
cumbered assets. Proposal, supra note 6, at 1.
44 The deficiency claim of the secured creditor would be treated pai passu with gen-
eral unsecured claims, but would be senior to any unsecured claim that is subordinated
generally or is subordinated to debts for money borrowed. See generally 11 U.S.C.
§§ 506(a), 510, 726(b), 1129 (1994) (detailing a similar statutory scheme).
45 See, e.g., United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982); Ogden v. Saun-
ders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
1476 [Vol. 82:1466
DEFENSE OF THE CARVE-OUT PROPOSAL
or interest in property, rather than property itself.46 But under state
law, the Proposal cannot be applied retroactively because to do so
would constitute an impairment of obligation under contract, in viola-
tion of the Constitution.47 Of course, the Contracts Clause does not
constrain Congress, 48 which could provide for retroactive application
of the Proposal under the Commerce Clause.49 Nevertheless, Con-
gress is unlikely to do so because of the politics of federalizing com-
mercial law and the potential for takings litigation that such
legislation would spawn.50
D. Criticism Number 4: The Proposal's Use of 20% Is Arbitrary
and Will Hurt Several Forms of Financing
Of course, the Proposal's selection of 20% is arbitrary, but only to
the extent that it reflects the exercise of discretion. In no way is the
20% figure unreasonable or unprecedented. By way of comparison,
Germany imposes a cumulative 9% surcharge against collateral to per-
mit the estate to recoup costs from collateral sold in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings.51 In addition, under German law, the secured lender must
pay a 15% turnover tax on the sale of collateral in insolvency proceed-
46 See Steve H. Nickles, Consider Process Before Substance, Commercial Law Consequences of
the Bankruptcy System: Urging the Merger of the Article 9 Drafting Committee and the Bankruptcy
Commission, 69 AM. BANKR. LJ. 589, 593-94 & n.12 (1995). Cf XL/Datacomp, Inc. v. Wilson
(In re Omegas Group, Inc.), 16 F.3d 1443, 1451 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that, under state
law, a constructive trust was only a remedy rather than a property right that would override
ratable distribution in bankruptcy).
47 The Contracts Clause provides that "[n ] o State shall... pass any ... Law impairing
the Obligation of Contracts." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; cf. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819) (precluding state insolvency laws from applying retroactively to
debts incurred before enactment, based on Contracts Clause concerns).
48 The Commerce Clause provides that the Congress shall have the power "To regu-
late Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States .... " U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3.
49 See, e.g., Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry.
Co., 294 U.S. 648, 680 (1935) (holding that "Congress... has authority to pass legislation
pertinent to any of the powers conferred by the Constitution, however it may operate col-
laterally or incidentally to impair or destroy the obligation of private contracts").
50 Federal regulation of matters affecting commerce has a long history of inviting
constitutional challenge under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Ruck-
elshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (challenging pesticide registration scheme
imposed by Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act); Hodel v. Indiana, 452
U.S. 314 (1981) (challenging federal regulation of coal mining under Surface Mining Con-
trol and Reclamation Act of 1977); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (challenging pro-
hibition on sale of eagle and bird artifacts under Eagle Protection and Migratory Birds
Treaty Acts); Highland v. Russell Car & Snow Plow Co., 279 U.S. 253 (1929) (challenging
federal fixing of coal prices under Lever Act).
51 Insolvenzordnung (InsO) [Insolvency Statute], 5.10.1994 (BGB1.I S.2866), § 171.
Subsection (1) assesses a 4% charge as a cost of determination of the collateral. Subsec-
tion (2) assesses a 5% charge as a cost of disposition of the collateral. These costs are
assessed against the collateral in rem. See id.
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ings, for a total possible cost to the secured party of 24%.52 The 20%
number in the Proposal is reasonable by comparison; moreover, it
should be large enough to affect secured creditors in making credit
decisions and provide a meaningful pot for unsecured creditors or the
bankruptcy trustee. Thus, monitoring by secured creditors will im-
prove the efficiency of secured lending, and the residual pot will facili-
tate rehabilitation if the debtor defaults.
Nevertheless, the 20% figure may not work for all forms of financ-
ing. Some fine-tuning may be necessary based on actual experience.
At this juncture, it might be prudent to consider modifying the Propo-
sal to exclude its application to purchase money financing, as long as
the secured creditor takes no other collateral. Moreover, the Proposal
probably should not apply to financial services debtors such as banks,
credit unions, stock brokerages, and the like, where high loan-to-value
ratios are the norm53 and the presence of nonadjusting creditors is
insignificant or remote.5 4 However, for the manufacturing or nonfi-
nancial services debtor, the Proposal should be applied as drafted.
E. Criticism Number 5: The Proposal Will Defeat Uniformity
and Lead to a Race to the Bottom
Critics contend that the Proposal will not be adopted as a uni-
form state law.55 Therefore, secured creditors will force debtors to
reincorporate in states that refuse to adopt the Proposal. This will
create a race to the bottom and discourage legislatures from adopting
the Proposal.
The uniformity concern is an important issue under existing law.
To the extent commercial law is nonuniform, perhaps it should be
federalized.56 That way, Congress could use the Commerce Clause 57
to enact uniform commercial laws that balance commercial law and
bankruptcy law issues.
52 Id. § 171(2). If the collateral is sufficient, the surplus will fund the 9% costs under
§ 171.
53 See, e.g., Letter from H. Bruce Bernstein to Edwin Smith, supra note 9, at 2 n.2.
54 Financial institutions do not normally face large numbers of tort claims. They do
have numerous small, unsophisticated creditors (depositors or customers) to which regula-
tory law grants priority or protection. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a) (1) (1994) (guaranteeing up
to $100,000 insurance for a depositor at an FDIC-insured institution).
55 See, e.g., Letter from Howard Ruda to Geoffrey C. Hazard, supra note 11, at 4 ("[I]
wonder whether a non-uniform enactment of the 20% Rule would result in the non-enact-
ing states offering (or seeming to offer) a more congenial borrowing environment to the
business community."); Turner, supra note 8, at 3 (" [N] on-uniformity would be sure to
prevail on this point.").
56 See Nickles, supra note 46, at 595 ("Whether federalizing commercial law is good or
bad depends, ultimately, on whether the federal legislative process is 'better' than the uni-
form laws process.").
57 See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
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In the meantime, current commercial law is nonuniform. 58 For
example, some states permit deposit accounts to be subject to Article
9 security interests, while others do not.59 Yet there is no empirical
evidence that creditors have abandoned financing in states where de-
posit accounts cannot be taken as Article 9 collateral. 60 Nor is it con-
tended that financing costs are higher in such states. 6 ' In fact, the
differences in commercial law permit the states to serve as laboratories
in which to experiment with improvements in commercial law on a
trial basis. 62 In the short run, the best way to test the Proposal in
practice would be to compare data in a nonuniform environment.
This comparison should happen naturally as different state legisla-
tures proceed at different rates to adopt the Proposal. Theoretically,
if the Proposal proves to maximize social welfare, more states will
adopt it; if not, the Proposal will disappear from the books.
F. Criticism Number 6: The Proposal Is Based on the Flawed
Premise that Debtors and Secured Creditors Collude to
Perpetuate the Longevity of Failing Businesses to
the Detriment of Unsecured Creditors
Critics of the Proposal contend that secured creditors and debt-
ors have no reason to collude to support failing businesses.63 They
argue that secured creditors have no incentive to overleverage a bor-
rower or to lend to a debtor that is highly likely to default. By the
same token, the argument continues, debtors have no incentive to
overcollateralize their secured creditors, because unsecured creditors
58 SeeJAmFsJ. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1, at 7 (3d
ed. 1988) ("As early as 1967, the various jurisdictions enacting the Code had made approxi-
mately 775 separate amendments to it. Article Nine on security interests in personal prop-
erty was the chief victim of the nonuniform amendments.") (citations omitted).
59 Compare CAL. COM. CODE § 9302(1) (g) (West 1990 & Supp. 1997); 810 ILL. COMp.
STAT. ANN. 5/9-302(i) (Supp. 1997) (permitting a secured party to take an Article 9 secur-
ity interest in deposit accounts), with N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 9-104(o (McKinney 1990) (exclud-
ing from Article 9 a transfer of an interest in any deposit account except with respect to
proceeds and priorities in proceeds); 13 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9104(12) (West 1984)
(same); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.104(12) (West 1991) (same).
60 Indeed, my own experience is that NewYork law is selected frequently as the lav of
choice in many public and private financings.
61 Despite all of the talent on the Article 9 Drafting Committee, the Committee has
made no effort to collect empirical data comparing the cost of financing in Article 9 juris-
dictions that permit the encumbrance of deposit accounts with those that do not.
62 See, e.g., Mann, supra note 28, at 31-42 (noting the relative advantages of state laws
that subordinate construction lenders' liens to contractors' liens); Edwin E. Smith, Should
the Scope of an Article 9 Security Interest Be Limited? If So, How? 2 (Oct. 31, 1995)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (where a state has adopted a non-uniform
amendment "we should review that state's experience to see what guidance it may
provide").
63 See, e.g., Letter from H. Bruce Bernstein to Edwin Smith, supra note 9, at 1-2; Letter
from Jeffrey S. Turner to Members of the Article 9 Drafting Committee, supra note 31, at 4-
5.
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would refuse to extend trade credit in those circumstances. These ar-
guments prove too much and, in some cases, are mistaken.
Secured creditors have several reasons to engage in a highly lever-
aged transaction. The leveraged buyout cases of the 1980s bear wit-
ness to the damage that fee-driven lending can cause.64 Specifically,
banks and other financial institutions made unsound loans based on
euphoric projections that had little chance of occurring.65 Bank of-
ficers booked lucrative short term fees. 66 If the risky transactions paid
off, the bank did well and the bank's senior officers profited through
the increased value of their stock options. If the loans failed, the bank
officers could move on to another job. If the bank itself failed, the
FDIC and American taxpayers could bail out the bank's depositors. 67
The debtor's selling shareholders profited handsomely by receipt of
value in the leveraged buyout.68 Existing unsecured creditors were
exposed to increased risks, as were nonadjusting future creditors.
Some secured lenders engage in "asset-based" lending of a perni-
cious character. They lend on a secured basis at high interest rates to
marginal debtors and also obtain a personal guarantee secured by the
debtor's president's personal assets and stock in the business. The
amount loaned is not quite enough to let the debtor survive. Cove-
nants are so tight that the slightest slip in future performances places
the debtor in default. If the debtor pays, the lender receives a hand-
some return on investment. If the debtor defaults, the lender takes
control of the business and either liquidates the assets or operates the
business as a going concern. Thus, the personal guarantee acts as in-
surance against the debtor filing a voluntary Chapter 11 case.
History teaches us that collusion arises in the workout context
where the lender both engages in a friendly foreclosure to squeeze
64 See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Pearl Brewing Co. (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 952 F.2d
1230 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir.
1986); Murphy v. Meritor Sav. Bank (In re O'Day Corp.), 126 B.R. 370 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1991); Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 B.R. 488 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
65 See, e.g., O'Day Corp., 126 B.R. at 379-81, 405-09 (investment banker and bank of-
ficer proceeded to finance LBO based upon unrealistic projections, ignoring substantial
available information indicating the debtor's financial decline).
66 See, e.g., Mellon Bank v. Metro Communications, Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 646 (3d Cir.
1991); Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring. The Empirical Evidence,
39 UCLA L. REv. 895, 924 n.131 (1992);John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Controk The
Institutional Investor As Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. Rgv. 1277, 1315 & n.160 (1991);
Charles M. Elson, Fairness Opinions: Are They Fair or Should We Care?, 53 Omo ST. L.J. 951,
965-68 (1992); Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance:
The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 187, 223 & n.111 (1991);James F.
Queenan, Jr., The Collapsed Leveraged Buyout and the Trustee in Bankruptcy, 11 CARDozo L.
REv. 1, 3 (1989).
67 See supra note 54; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1821(f) (1994) (providing mechanism for
payment of depositors in insured financial institutions that are liquidated or closed).
68 See, e.g., Kaiser Stee4 952 F.2d at 1237-40 (permitting selling shareholders to retain
LBO payments as "settlement" payments).
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out unsecured creditors and gives the debtor's managers long term
contracts to operate the foreclosed business. The equity receivership
cases of the early twentieth century typify this kind of collusion. 69
Although the Bankruptcy Code was designed to preclude this result,
the practice persists regarding small businesses whose creditors are
unlikely to file an involuntary bankruptcy petition.
As for debtor incentives, most debtors do not have the bargaining
leverage to deny collateral to the secured party.70 If the debtor wants
new money to solve a liquidity crisis, it signs the lender's form and
worries about the consequences later. The exception arises in indus-
tries where the volume of unsecured credit the market extends far
outweighs the credit that the secured party will extend. For example,
in the retail clothing store, drug store, or grocery store businesses,
most inventory is lien free. The volume of unsecured trade credit is
enormous in comparison to what a secured creditor will advance.
Moreover, in these businesses, the debtor's payables often are fac-
tored by its vendors.71 The factors will refuse to take the vendor's
receivables if a lien is placed on the debtor's assets. In turn, this will
result in an evaporation of trade credit for the debtor. The debtor
would face an enormous liquidity crisis and would turn to its secured
lender for more credit. Based on the level of cash required, the se-
cured creditor would prefer that the trade creditors finance the
debtor. Therefore, the debtor's secured lender will not encumber the
debtor's inventory because it is in its own economic interest not to do
SO.
69 See, e.g., Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods., Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939); Kansas City
S. Ry. Co. v. Guardian Trust Co., 240 U.S. 166 (1916); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228
U.S. 482 (1913). See generally 7 COLLER ON BANcRurrcy' 1129-185 to -198 (Lawrence P.
King ed., 15th ed. 1996) (discussing Boyd and Case).
70 See, e.g., Ven Countryman, Code Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 75 CoM. LJ. 269, 269
(1970) ("[Many practitioners and bankruptcy referees] report that... more and more
bankruptcy cases emerge with every scrap of the bankrupt's property covered by some sort
of a Code security interest. ... That means, of course, that nothing will be distributed to
any unsecured creditor, with or without priority."); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Credi-
tor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. Rxv. 1887, 1932 (1994) ("Except among the largest firms, it is a rare
debtor that, at the time of liquidation, has assets not encumbered beyond their liquidation
value.").
71 "Factors" provide inventory financing to sellers of goods (usually without nonpay-
ment recourse against the sellers) by advancing purchase money directly to manufacturers
of those goods and taking a security interest in the sellers' accounts receivable. Advance
rates are based upon a fixed percentage of those receivables. See generallyJAmEsJ. WHITE &
ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 21-8, at 746-47 (4th ed. 1995) (explain-
ing "factors"); Edward S. Adams et al., A Revised Filing System: Recommendations and Innova-
tions, 79 MINN. L. REv. 877, 886-87 (1995) (describing "factors" in the textile industry).
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CONCLUSION
The broad-based critiques of the Proposal are largely without
merit. The American Law Institute and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws should adopt the Proposal if
they continue to proceed with efforts to expand the scope of Article 9
of the Uniform Commercial Code. Conceivably, it is asking too much
of organizations whose drafting committees are dominated by attor-
neys who regularly represent secured creditors and academics who
teach commercial law, to recommend a balanced approach with re-
spect to secured credit. On the other hand, unless the Proposal, or
something like it, is adopted, there is a remote possibility that Con-
gress might exercise its prerogative under the Commerce Clause72
and the Supremacy Clause73 to federalize the laws of commercial
transactions. Perhaps as we move toward the twenty-first century, it is
time for Congress to do so.
72 See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text
73 Article VI of the Constitution provides that "[tlhis Constitution, and the Laws of
the United States... shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONST. art. VI, ci. 2.
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